Abstract-Voltage collapse is a type of blackout-inducing dynamic instability that occurs when the power demand exceeds the maximum power that can be transferred through the network. The traditional (preventive) approach to avoid voltage collapse is based on ensuring that the network never reaches its maximum capacity. However, such an approach leads to inefficiencies as it prevents operators to fully utilize the network resources and does not account for unprescribed events. To overcome this limitation, this paper seeks to initiate the study of voltage collapse stabilization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Voltage collapse (VC) is a type of outage in power networks that arises when the aggregate power demand exceeds the capacity of the network to transfer the required power [1] , [2] , [3] . When such a point is achieved, (inflexible) constant power loads tend to rapidly reduce their effective impedance bringing the voltage abruptly to zero. While this mechanism is intrinsically dynamic, associated with a saddle node bifurcation [4] , [5] , the inability to correct this behavior from the generation side has lead power engineers to take a rather static (preventive) approach to address it. That is, to ensure that the point of maximum network loading is never reached [6] . As a consequence, there has been a vast body of work trying to quantify voltage stability margins. This includes classical works, such as [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] and more recently, [11] , [12] . However, this approach leads to inefficiencies as it prevents operators to fully utilize the network resources and does not account for unprescribed events that can still produce a blackout.
This work seeks to initiate the study of voltage collapse stabilization. More precisely, we aim to investigate how to use (flexible) demand response to reduce consumption to match network capacity -when the total demand exceeds itand prevent inflexible demand from driving the system to voltage collapse. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first effort on addressing the dynamic aspect of voltage collapse to design controllers aimed at preventing it. Such control schemes requires to overcome two main challenges. Firstly, it needs to stabilize an operating point that under inflexible load behavior is unstable. 1 Secondly, it needs to prevent collapse even in the presence of inflexible loads.
The work is motivated by the rapid development of power electronics and information technology [14] that, for the first time since the power system inception, has the potential to provide enough demand-side controllability that could allow to envision the possibility of stabilizing voltage collapse. However, despite the additional flexibility that controllable demand provides, there are numerous questions that remain to be answered. Among them:
• Is voltage collapse stabilization possible?
• Can stabilization be achieved via decentralized actions?
• How should we allocate the necessary demand reduction among the flexible loads?
In this paper, we build a game theoretic framework to investigate these questions in the context of direct current (DC) networks. More precisely, we consider a star resistive DC network where each load seeks to consume a constant power by dynamically updating its conductance using a standard voltage droop. We show that such system can be interpreted as a dynamic game, where each player (load) seeks to (locally) maximize its utility, and where every stable power flow solution amounts to a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) (Section III). Interestingly, voltage collapse can then be interpreted as the consequence of selfish actions of noncooperative demand, which leads to the need of introducing coordination to overcome it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our DC network model of constant power loads as well as some required game theory terminology. Section III frames our network model as a load satisfiability game where the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the voltage collapse state, and shows that stable power flow solutions are LNE that prevent myopic players to reach their NE. Section IV describes our voltage collapse stabilizer controller and studies its static and dynamic properties. We illustrate several features of our controllers using numerical simulations in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce the network model to be considered in this paper as well as the game theoretic framework to be used.
A. DC Power Network Model
We consider the star DC network model described in Figure 1 , where E denotes the source voltage, and g l the conductance of a transmission line that transfer power to n loads and g i denotes the ith load conductance, i ∈ N := {1, . . . , n}. We consider two types of loads, the flexible loads, belonging to the set F = {1, ..., n F } (n F = |F |), and the inflexible loads, belonging to I = {n F + 1, ..., n}, n I = |I|. Hence, the set of all loads is N = I ∪ F = {1, . . . , n}. We further use g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) ∈ R n ≥0 to denote the vector of conductances and g −i ∈ R n−1 the vector of all load conductances except g i .
Using this notation, we can use Kirchoff's voltage and current laws (KVL and KCL) to compute the voltage applied to each load
Thus, the total power consumed by each load i ∈ N becomes
where g eq (g) = i∈N g i is the equivalent conductance. The difference between the power consumed by each load i ∈ N and its nominal demand P 0,i is
The total power consumed by all the loads in the system is
For an arbitrary set S ⊂ N , the aggregate power consumed by every i ∈ S is
where
The system (10) undergoes voltage collapse whenever v(g(t)) → 0 as t → +∞.
Network Capacity (P S,max ): Since voltage collapse is the result of the network reaching its maximum capacity [2] , it is of interest to compute the maximum value that P S (g) in (5) can achieve for fixed value of g S c .
A straightforward calculation shows that for all i ∈ S
which implies that
From (7), it is easy to see that P S (g S ; g S c ) is an increasing function of g S up until g S = g l + g S c , and decreasing for all g S > g l + g S c . Therefore, the maximum power that can be supplied to the loads in S is given by
and is achieved whenever g * S = i∈S g * i = g l + g S c . In the special case where S = N , (8) becomes:
and it is achieved by g * N = g eq (g * ) = i∈N g * i = g l . Dynamic Load Model: We assume that each load i ∈ N has a constant power demand P 0,i . For an inflexible load i ∈ I, this demand P 0,i must always be satisfied. This is achieved by dynamically changing the conductance g i in order to change the power consumption P i (g). Following [2] , we use the following dynamic model
For the case of flexible loads, we assume that although they aim to satisfy their own constant power demand P 0,i , at the same time they are willing to consume less than P 0,i whenever P 0,tot := i∈N P 0,i > P max . Thus, our goal it to design a control lawġ
where the input u i is such that in equilibrium ∆P i (g) = 0 whenever P 0,tot < P max .
Power Flow Solutions: Given an equilibrium g * of (10)-(11), there exists a unique voltage v(g * ) and power consumption P (g * ) = (P i (g * ), i ∈ N ). The pair (v, P ) is referred as power flow solution. Thus, given the one-to-one relationship between g and the pair (v, P ), we refer to g * as a power flow solution.
B. Game Theory
We now present the game theoretical preliminaries that will allows us to better grasp the level of coordination required to prevent voltage collapse.
Definition 2 (Normal Form Game [15] ): A Normal Form Game is given by the triple N, S, u where: 1) N = {1, ..., n}, is the set of players.
2) S := S 1 × ... × S n , with S i being the strategy set of player i ∈ N , is the set of strategies.
∀i ∈ N , is the set of payoff functions. Given a game N, S, u we seek to understand the set of strategies s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S for which every player has no incentive to move. Moreover, since in our context it is in general difficult to understand the best response of each player, we focus on locally optimal strategies.
Definition 3 (Nash Equlibirum [15] ): A strategy s * = (s 1 , .., s n ) ∈ S is a (strict) Nash Equilibrium (NE) if and only if for each i ∈ N 
Whenever the payoff functions u i are sufficiently smooth, it is possible to verify (13) using first and second order derivatives.
Lemma 1 (Criterion for LNE [16] ): Given a game N, {S i , i ∈ N }, {u i , i ∈ N } with doubly continuously differentiable payoff functions, a strategy
III. GAME THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION OF VOLTAGE COLLAPSE
In this section we build a game theoretical framework that provides a deeper insight on the voltage collapse phenomenon and further suggests the necessity of coordination among resources in order to prevent voltage collapse without incurring unnecessary inefficiencies.
A. A Game for Inflexible Constant Power Loads
In our formulation, the set of players is the set of loads, both conveniently denoted by N . We consider here the case of inflexible loads, that is, I = N and F = ∅. For each player i ∈ N the strategy s i is given by its conductance g i ≥ 0. Therefore, the strategy set S := R n ≥0 . Following Definition 2, it remains to define the utility function of each agent i ∈ N . The following proposition motivates a particular choice of payoff function.
Proposition 1: Consider the game N, S, u , where S = R n ≥0 and for each load i ∈ N the utility function is given by
where g −i denotes g N \{i} = j =i g j . Then, the inflexible load dynamics (10) amounts to the myopic gradient dynamicṡ
As a consequence, if g * ∈ R n ≥0 is a LNE of N, S, u , then it is an equilibrium of (10).
Proof: From equation (10), it follows that if u is the payoff function of the game N, S, u , then
Integrating above expression with respect to g i gives
We retrieve (15) by substituting for the limit values.
Proposition 1 reverse engineers the utility function such that any LNE is an equilibrium of (10). Thus, although this suggests that some of the power flow solutions -which are represented by the equilibria of (10)-may constitute a LNE, the following theorem unveils a rather surprising fact.
Theorem 1 (Voltage Collapse is the Unique NE): Given the induced game N, R n ≥0 , u with utility given by (15) , the strategy g i → +∞ ∀i ∈ N is the unique Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: We first show that each player maximizes their utility by setting g i → +∞. Using (15),
The previous derivation assumes that all other agents decide finite conductances. In the case where any other agent j = i is also choosing g j → ∞, then a similar computation using (15) gives
Therefore, choosing g i → +∞ is a strictly dominant strategy for agent i, i.e. it is the best possible strategy regardless of the strategy chosen by all other agents. Theorem 1 unveils an unusual phenomenon. The normal (and desired) operating point of the DC network in Figure  1 , that represents a stable power flow solution of (10), is not a Nash Equilibrium of the game. We will show next, that these stable points are in fact LNE that, because of the myopic nature of (16), prevent players from moving towards Voltage Collapse.
B. Stable Equilibria are LNE
We focus now in the case where P 0,tot < P max , which ensures the existence of power flow solutions, i.e., equilibria in (10), with I = N .
Definition 5 (S-LNE): A point g * is a Stable Local Nash Equilibrium (S-LNE) if it is a Local Nash Equilibrium of the induced game N, S, u and a Stable Equilibrium of (10) .
We start by first characterizing the region of stable equilibria. For this reason, we consider the set
Lemma 2 (Characterization of Stable Region): A hyperbolic equilibrium 2 point g * of (10) is stable if and only if g * ∈ M . Proof:
Let g * be an equilibrium of (10), i.e., ∆P i (g * i ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . The Jacobian of the system is given by
where I n is the identity matrix.
. . , n − 1}, and one non-zero eigenvalue
Therefore, since the second term in (17) is an identity matrix, the eigenvalues of J(g * ) are a shifted from the eigenvalues of
We can now prove the statement of the lemma.
(⇒) If g * is an asymptotically stable hyperbolic equilibrium, then J(g * ) is Hurwitz and thus:
We are now ready to show the main result of this section. Theorem 2 (Characterization of Stable Equilibria): Every stable equilibria of (10) is a LNE of N, S, u .
Proof: Let g * be a stable equilibrium of (10). Then by Lemma 2, g * ∈ M .
* is a LNE. Remark 1: Notice that not all LNE are stable equilibria. A LNE is a point for which the diagonal elements of the Jacobian are negative, which does not guarantee that J(g * ) is Hurwitz. A counter-example is the case of two loads (N = {1, 2}) whose demand P 0,1 , P 0,2 is such that: 0 < g 1 < g l and g l < g 2 < g l + g 1 . The vector g = (g 1 , g 2 ) / ∈ M , but:
This point is indeed a LNE, but not a stable equilibrium of (10) since g 1 + g 2 > g l .
C. Voltage Collapse with Inflexible Loads
We now show how in the overload regime (P 0,tot > P max ), the players indeed drive the system to the unique NE.
Theorem 3 (Voltage Collapse with Inflexible Loads): The dynamic load model (10) with I = N undergoes a voltage collapse whenever ε := P 0,tot − P max > 0.
Proof: Notice first that R n ≥0 is invariant, since whenever g i = 0 (10) implies thatġ i > 0. Also, it is easy to check that (10) is globally Lipschitz on R n ≥0 since g l > 0. Thus 
By taking the time derivative of V we geṫ
in finite time and therefore ||g(t)||→ ∞ as t → ∞. It follows then that g eq (t) grows unboundedly and by (1) v(g(t)) → 0, i.e., the system voltage collapses.
Remark 2: Theorem 3 further suggests that our model for inflexible loads successfully captures the property that excess on power demand beyond the network capacity implies voltage collapse.
D. Behavioral Interpretation of Voltage Collapse
We conclude this section by illustrating how the game theoretical framework developed above allow us to obtain a behavioral interpretation of voltage collapse.
As Theorem 1 shows, a game representation of (10), for which power flow solutions can provide some notion of (local) optimality (LNE), naturally leads to voltage collapse as a dominant strategy. This suggests that it is the selfish behavior of each player -that seeks to maximize their own payoffthat constitute the underlying cause of voltage collapse. Surprisingly, under normal operating conditions (P 0,tot < P max ), it is the myopic behavior of each player, who can only assess optimality within a neighborhood, that prevents the players from converging to the dominant strategy (Theorem 2). As soon as such locally optimal solutions disappear (when P 0,tot > P max ), the players converge to voltage collapse (Theorem 3).
In summary, voltage collapse is intrinsically connected to the selfish myopic desire of each load to match its required consumption, even when the network cannot provide such aggregate amount of power. This behavior is reminiscent of the one present in the tragedy of the commons [17] , and further suggests that certain level of coordination may be required in order to prevent voltage collapse. This is the basis of the solution proposed next.
IV. VOLTAGE COLLAPSE STABILIZER CONTROL
We now focus our attention to the task of preventing voltage collapse. Thus, we assume that there exists a subset of the loads F ⊆ N , F = ∅, that are receptive to curtailment. However, from an efficiency perspective, such curtailment should only occur whenever the total demand exceeds the network capacity (P 0,tot > P max ). Moreover, if curtailment does occur, it should be fairly allocated among the flexible loads. These design objectives are summarized in the following problem formulation.
Problem 1 (Voltage Collapse Stabilization): Design a control signal u i , i ∈ F , such that:
• Load Satisfaction: Whenever P 0,tot < P max the equilibrium
is the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium within M .
• Efficient Allocation: Whenever P 0,tot > P max , the only stable equilibrium g * leads to a curtailment allocation that is the optimal solution to minimize ∆Pi,i∈F i∈F
We will call a controller u that solves Problem 1 a Voltage Collapse Stabilizer (VCS) Controller. The rest of this section is devoted to show that the following control law is a VCS Controller:ġ
with γ i = θ i j∈F 1 θj and κ is a positive parameter: 0 < κ < ∞.
Remark 3: The term α i (g) aims to introduce a new equilibrium point g * when P 0,tot > P max such that, whenever g * satisfies α i (g * ) = 0 ∀i ∈ F , {∆P i (g * ), i ∈ F } is a solution to (18) . However, as we show in the next section, this can tentatively introduce new equilibria.
A. Characterization of Equilibria
We now proceed to characterize the set of equilibria of (19) . Given a set of indices G, consider
It is easy to see that the set {∪ G⊆F E G } compactly encapsulates every equilibrium of (19) . The following lemma will allow us to further characterize each set (22).
Lemma 4 (Characterization of E G ): Given any set G ⊆ F , the set E G composes of two equilibria g * 1 , g * 2 such that g * 1,i = g * 2,i =ḡ i ∀i ∈ G, and i∈G c g *
Moreover, whenever G = F , then g *
Following (5), let g * G c = i∈G c g * i andḡ G = i∈Gḡ i . We will solve
, namely when the demand does not exceed the capabilities of the line. Moreover, the first and second order derivative of f (g * G c ) and
In addition, f ∈ C ∞ [0, ∞),
Hence, if f max > 0 (which is true solely when P 0,G c (g 
= g l where in the unmarked equality we used fact that i∈F
We now show that our controller (19) does in fact guarantee the existence of an equilibrium that solves (18) .
Theorem 4 (Efficient Allocation): Consider the system (19) with equilibria characterized by the set E F as shown in (22). Then, the conductance g * ∈ E F ∩ cl(M ) = {g * } leads to an efficient curtailment {∆P i (g * ), i ∈ F } that is optimal w.r.t. (18) .
Proof: We have shown in Lemma 4 that there exists g * 1 ∈ E F such that g eq (g * 1 ) = g l , i.e. g * 1 ∈ E F ∩ cl(M ). For this equilibrium, the total power is
= P max For g * 1 we can compute the allocation of the curtailment among loads i ∈ F :
We can easily check that the allocation of the curtailment is proportional to the θs
and thus is an Efficient Allocation. Remark 4: Theorem 4 only guarantees that one of the equilibria of E F solves (18) . However, it does not provide any information regarding all the possible additional equilibria E G . We will show that the remaining equilibria either do not exist, are unstable, or do not belong to the monotonicity region M .
We conclude this section showing a case where E G = ∅. Theorem 5 (Infeasiblity of E G under extreme loading):
Proof: Since G ⊂ F , then there exists a non empty set
We will now look at how P G c (g * G c ;ḡ G ) behaves with respect to g * G c . Similarly to (7), P G c (g * G c ;ḡ G ) is a strictly increasing function for g * G c < g l +ḡ G . Therefore:
where in the first equality we have substituted forḡ G c = g l −ḡ G and in the last step we have substituted (21) and rearranged the terms. However, since g * ∈ G, then (22) and thus
So far we have shown that whenever P 0,tot > P max , the only feasible set E G is E F , and E F contains the equilibrium that solves the efficient curtailment problem (18) . The next section will show that this is in fact the only stable equilibrium under extreme loading conditions.
B. Stability Analysis
In this Section we will study the stability of the different equilibria with the objective of showing that the chosen controller solves Problem 1 and thus qualifies as a VCS Controller.
The following lemma will be of use in the eigenvalue computation.
Lemma 5 (Matrix Determinant Lemma [19] ): If D is an invertible n × n matrix and v, w ∈ R n , then:
We can now compute the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (19) Lemma 6 (Computation of Eigenvalues of (19)): Consider the system (19) . Then, the eigenvalues of its Jacobian J C (g) at each point g satisfy:
Proof: The Jacobian of this system is
The eigenvalues of J C (g) are given as the solution of det(J C (g)−λI n ) = 0. Notice that J C (g)−λI n is composed by a diagonal matrix
Moreover, the entries of D(g, λ) can be written as
1+κ(ḡi−gi)) 2 . Therefore, using [19] we can compute (D(g, λ) ), which implies that either λ i is either equal to ∆P i (g)κ or is a solution to c(λ) = 0. Result follows.
Having characterized the eigenvalues of J C (g * ), we now analyze the stability of the equilibria of (22).
Theorem 6 (Stability of VCS Controller): Consider the system (19) . Then, for 0 < κ < ∞ the following holds:
(1) When i∈N P 0,i > P max , the only asymptotically stable equilibrium is given by g * ∈ E F ∩ cl(M ) = {g * }. (2) When i∈N P 0,i < P max , then the only asymptotically stable equilibrium within the closure of M is given by g * ∈ E ∅ ∩ cl(M ) = {g * }. Proof: (1) Let i∈N P 0,i > P max . Then, by Proposition 3 there does not exist g * such that ∆P i (g * ) = 0, ∀i ∈ N . That is, if G = ∅ then E ∅ = ∅. Moreover, by Theorem 5, if ∅ = G ⊂ F , then again E G = ∅. Therefore, when P 0,tot > P max , E G is nonempty only for G = F . Now for g * ∈ E F , Lemma 4 shows that E F comprises of two equilibria g * 1 , g * 2 . We will first examine g * 1 . Again, by Lemma 4, g eq (g * 1 ) = g l and by Lemma 6 the eigenvalues of λ i = ∆P i (g * )κ for all i ∈ F . Therefore, since
The rest of the eigenvalues are computed from (32) by substituting α i (g * 1,i ) = 0 for i ∈ F and α i (g *
It is easy to show, following the analysis of [20] , that c(g, λ) always has real roots. We will examine the sign of the roots of c(g * , λ) by first looking at its derivative:
Hence, since the denominator is non-singular for λ ≥ 0, c(g * 1 , λ) is continuous and strictly increasing for λ ∈ [0, +∞). Moreover, c(g * 1 , 0) = 1 − 2 i∈I g1,i geq(g * 1 )+g l > 0. Therefore, there does not exist λ ≥ 0 such that c(g * 1 , λ) = 0. Consequently, λ i < 0 for all i ∈ I and we have shown above that λ i < 0 also for all i ∈ F . Therefore, by Lyapunov's Inidrect Method [13, Theorem 3.2] g * 1 ∈ E F is a stable equilibrium of (19) .
The analysis for g * 2 ∈ E F is analogous. The function c(g * 2 , λ) is again continuous and strictly increasing for λ ∈ [0, +∞). However, since by Lemma 4 g *
Thus, by Lemma 3 there existsλ ∈ (0, +∞) such that c(g * 2 ,λ) = 0. Since J C (g * 2 ) has at least one positive eigenvalue, using again [13, Theorem 3.2] we can conclude that g * 2 is unstable.
(2) Let i∈N P 0,i < P max and g * ∈ E ∅ ∩ cl(M ). In this case g * i =ḡ i ∀i ∈ N (otherwise g * / ∈ E ∅ ). Therefore α i (g * i ) = 0. From (31) the eigenvalues of the system satisfy:
For the nth eigenvalue, we observe that c(g
Therefore, the nth eigenvalue is also negative and from [13,
for an arbitrary G = ∅, then the only equilibrium that satisfies this condition is g *
Since there exists at least one positive eigenvalue, [13, Theorem 3.2] implies that the equilibrium is unstable. Therefore, the only stable eigenvalue is g * 1 ∈ E ∅ ∩ cl(M ). Theorem 6 shows that (19) is indeed a Voltage Collapse Stabilizer Controller.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we validate our theoretical results using numerical illustrations. We consider a DC grid as in Figure  1 with three loads. In all the experiments we start the simulations with initial set-points such that P 0,tot < P max and with conductances close to the equilibrium g * where all demands are met, i.e., g * ∈ E ∅ ∩M . Finally, we have chosen κ = 10. Case 1 (I=N={1,2,3}): Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of the system (10)-(11) consisting of only inflexible loads. We can see that as soon as the aggregate demand reaches P max , the system undergoes a voltage collapse. Case 3 (F={1,2},I={3}): Finally we illustrate a case with mixed load types where load 3 is inflexible, and our VCS controller is executed in loads 1 and 2. We observe in Figure  5 that the flexible loads (1, 2) adjust their demand proportionally to their assigned weights in order to accommodate the increasing demand of the inflexible load, again preventing voltage collapse. However, when the system runs out of flexible demand the system will eventually undergo a voltage collapse, as predicted in Lemma 4. We observe exactly this behavior in Figure 6 . 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work seeks to initiate the study of voltage collapse stabilization as a mechanism to provide a more efficient and reliable operation of electric power grids. We develop a game theoretical framework that sheds light on the behavioral mechanism that leads to voltage collapse and suggests the need of cooperation as a means to prevent it. Based on this insight, we propose a Voltage Collpase Stabilizer controller that is able to not only prevent voltage collapse, but also fairly distribute the curtailment among the flexible loads. Further research needs to be conducted to fully characterize the behavior of our solution. In particular, the point where P 0,tot = P max is a non-trivial point, where the Jacobian of the system is identically zero and thus requires the treatment of higher order dynamics. We identify two desired extensions of this work that are subject of current research: (a) extending the analysis to a general DC network and (b) extending the analysis to a general AC network.
